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The Civil Rights Act of 1991's 
Answer to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After two years of intense political warfare, two presiden-
tial vetoes, and two failed veto overrides, the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 (Act) finally became law on November 21, 1991. In 
large part, the Act is a congressional response to a number of 
recent United States Supreme Court cases, which many believe 
have seriously threatened the vitality of civil rights in the work 
place. To neutralize the perceived effects of these cases, the Act 
explicitly modifies the holdings of no fewer than five Supreme 
Court cases. 1 One of the cases modified by the Act is Lorance 
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc. 2 , the subject of this comment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
An employee that has suffered a harm recognized under 
Title VII must strictly comply with the procedural steps out-
lined below. 
First, the employee must file a claim of employment dis-
crimination within 180 days3 of the incident with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)4 or correspond-
ing state agency. This is a rigid statute of limitations require-
ment that swiftly cuts off untimely filed claims. 
1. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (modified by S. 
174fi, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § lOfi (1991)); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 
U.S. 900 (1989) (modified by § 112); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989) (modified by § lOfi); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) 
(modified by § 107); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (modified by § 108). 
2. 490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
:~. A proposal to increase the statute of limitations for Title VII and Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA) violations from lRO days to two years was 
eventually rejected. This extension would have brought the duration of the statute 
of limitations applied to nonracially-based employment discrimination claims, 180 
days, in line with the two year statute of limitations generally applied to racially-
based employment discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 
Supp. 1992). When this paper refers to the 180 day period, it is also making refer-
ence to the :iOO day period a claimant has to file his or her claim with the EEOC 
when that claimant has first filed his or her claim with a state agency pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-fi(e) (198R). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-fi(e) (1988). 
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If 180 days have passed before a claim is filed, the employ-
ee can only preserve the claim by showing that the statute was 
not triggered, the statute was tolled, or the continuous viola-
tion theory applies. 5 
If a claim is properly filed, the EEOC will examine the 
claim, negotiate with the employer, and eventually decide 
whether it will get involved in bringing the dispute to court.6 If 
it chooses not to get involved in the suit, it will send a notice 
informing the employee of his or her right to sue.7 The employ-
ee is then required to formally bring an action in court within 
ninety days of receipt.8 
Like the 180 day statute of limitations, this ninety day 
period may be equitably tolled. 9 However, unlike the 180 day 
statute of limitations, the continuing violation theory cannot be 
relied upon. 10 
These limitation periods are rigidly adhered to and must 
be met in order for a court to hear a case on its merits. 
III. MODIFYING LORANCE 
In Lorance, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of when the 180 ·day statute of limitations period 
begins to run for Title VII employment claims of discrimination 
when the alleged injury arises from an employer's seniority 
system. The Court held that the 180 day statute of limitations 
for seniority systems is only triggered once, and begins when 
the system, insofar as it is non-discriminatory on its face, is 
adopted. 
Lorance has primarily been criticized for categorically 
denying employees, hired more than 180 days after the adop-
tion of the seniority system, the right to assert a claim against 
an employer's discriminatory seniority system. 
The disdain for Lorance was shared by members from both 
political parties. 11 Therefore, the question was not whether 
fi. See discussion infra part III(D)(5). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(D(l) (1988). 
7. ld. 
R ld. 
9. See Rys v. Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 44::1 (1st Cir. 19R9); Johnson v. Postal 
Serv., 861 F.2d 1475 (lOth Cir. 1988); Jones v. American State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 
( Hth Cir. 19R8). 
10. Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
11. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 40(II), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694. 
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Lorance would be invalidated, but how it would be replaced. 12 
A. Facts and Holding of Lorance 
Up until 1979, the length of an employee's plant-wide ser-
vice was the basis for determining seniority at the AT&T facili-
ty where Lorance worked. 13 In 1979, a collective bargaining 
agreement was reached which changed the basis of seniority for 
"testers"-a job traditionally held by men-from duration of 
plant-wide service to that worked as a tester. 14 In 1982, a 
number of women, including Lorance, were demoted under the 
new seniority system. 15 The demoted women alleged that they 
would not have been demoted under the previous system based 
on plant-wide service and that the new seniority system based 
on time as a tester was adopted for the purpose of discriminat-
ing against women. 
The Court held that the statute of limitations barred plain-
tiffs from challenging the seniority system. 16 The Court rea-
soned that when a seniority system is nondiscriminatory on its 
face, it is the alleged discriminatory adoption of the seniority 
system that is the "occurrence" of the discriminatory practice 
that triggers the statute of limitations. 17 Thus, the statute of 
limitations was only triggered when the employment practice 
12. The initial Democratic version of the Act added the following paragraph to 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988): 
Where a seniority system or seniority practice is part of a 
collective bargaining agreement and such system or practice 
was included in such agreement with the intent to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin, the application of such system or practice during the 
period that such collective bargaining agreement is in effect 
shall be an unlawful employment practice. 
136 CONG. REc. 81020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). The Republican Administration's 
original version read: 
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs when a seniority 
system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a 
seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by 
the application of a seniority system, or provision thereof, 
that was adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose, 
in violation of the Title, whether or not that discriminatory 
purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision. 
136 CONG. REC. 81522 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990). 
13. 490 U.S. at 901-02. 
14. !d. 
15. !d. at 902. 
16. !d. at 912. 
17. !d. 
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was adopted in 1979, not when the women were demoted in 
1982. Because 180 days had passed from the time of adoption, 
the claim was time-barred. 
B. Reasoning of the Court 
1. Redefining the continuing violation standard 
In reaching its result, the Lorance Court first redefined the 
so-called continuing violation theory. 18 Prior to Lorance, Dela-
ware State College v. Ricks 19 and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ev-
ans20 were the primary cases dealing with the continuing vio-
lation theory. Collectively, Ricks and Evans stood for the propo-
sition that the continuing impact of past discrimination is not 
actionable. 
The Lorance Court redefined the continuing violation theo-
ry by incorporating the concept of "wholly dependant" into the 
verbal formulation. The Court stated, "A claim that is wholly 
dependent on discriminatory conduct occurring well outside the 
period of limitations [cannot constitute] a continuing viola-
tion."21 Under the "wholly dependent" language, not only is 
the continuing impact of past discrimination not actionable, but 
also non-actionable is any event "well outside" the 180 day 
statute of limitations that is wholly dependant on prior dis-
criminatory conduct. By barring claims dependant on past 
18. The continuing violation theory is a mainstay in Title VII jurisprudence. It 
allows an employee to file a claim that relates back to violation occurring before 
the 180 day period, as long as one of the incidents of discrimination occurred with-
in the 180 day period and the employer's action constitutes a "pattern of dis-
crimination." The most difficult part of the analysis is determining what constitutes 
a "pattern" and whether the incident occurring within the 180 day period is part 
of that pattern. 
19. 449 U.S. 250 (1980). In Ricks, a university teacher was denied tenure. 
Ricks was permitted to stay for a year beyond the time that tenure was denied. 
Ricks brought suit when he was let go. The Court held that the statute of limita-
tions began to run when the decision to deny tenure was communicated to Ricks. 
The eventual termination of employment was the "effect" of the denial of tenure 
and was neither a discriminatory occurrence nor an incident in a pattern. 
20. 4::ll U.S. 553 (1977). In Evans, the plaintiff was not given seniority credit 
for her earlier service when she was rehired after being terminated under a dis-
criminatory policy. The policy, which terminated stewardesses who became preg-
nant, was time barred. The loss of seniority resulting from the discharge was also 
time-barred and was held to be an effect. According to the Court, "a challenge to a 
neutral system may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event which 
has no present legal significance has affected the calculation of seniority credit, 
even if the past event might at one time have justified a valid claim against the 
employer." !d. at 560. 
21. 490 U.S. at 908. 
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discriminatory conduct, the modification circumvents the pri-
mary purpose underlying the continuing violation theory of 
allowing a claimant to relate back his or her claim by showing 
a pattern of discriminatory employment practices. 
In practical terms, the "wholly dependent" concept makes 
it more difficult for a plaintiff to rely on the continuing viola-
tion theory because the concept makes a plaintiff walk a very 
fine line. On the one hand, a claimant must show that a pat-
tern or policy of discrimination exists in order to come under 
the continuing violation theory. On the other hand, the events 
of discrimination need a certain level of disconnection or inde-
pendence, or else the subsequent events could be deemed 
"wholly dependent" on the initial discriminatory event, and 
therefore non-actionable. 22 
While the Act modifies many aspects of Lorance, as dis-
cussed later, the Act failed to expressly invalidate this new 
verbal formulation of the continuing violation theory. The effect 
of this omission is uncertain. It is conceivable that this portion 
of Lorance may still be relied on by the courts in defining the 
nature of the continuing violation theory. This would be unfor-
tunate. 
2. Special treatment of seniority systems under section 706(h) 
Having modified the continuing violation theory, the Court 
next made seniority systems practically invincible against legal 
challenges by deciding that the statute of limitations for a 
seniority system is triggered by its adoption. 
The Court reached this conclusion by emphasizing the 
special treatment given to seniority systems by section 706(h). 
In point of fact, however, the Court reliance on section 706(h) is 
misplaced. Section 706(h) insures the validity of seniority sys-
tems that treat and compensate people differently when those 
differences are related to experience and work assignments. In 
other words, section 706(h) allows different treatment when 
22. A showing under this standard will also be difficult because a certain de-
gree of dependency necessarily exists between all employment decisions. It is left, 
therefore, to the manipulation of the courts to decide whether a subsequent em-
ployment decision is sufficiently related to a prior decision so as to rise to the 
level of being "wholly dependent." 
On the other hand, the word "wholly" might place sufficient limitations on this 
standard. If focus is given to the word "wholly," then perhaps a simple showing of 
some remote degree of independence would suffice. By showing independence, how-
ever, one still runs the risk of jeopardizing his or her continuing violation claim. 
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there is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for doing so. 
Relying on section 706(h) to validate differences based on dis-
crimination, rather than merit, is wholly inconsistent with the 
underlying purpose of Title VII and is a serious misreading of 
section 706(h). The Court's ruling that the statute of limita-
tions for seniority systems is only triggered at adoption makes 
all actions, decisions, and practices made in connection with a 
seniority system per se "dependent" actions. Under such a rule, 
an employee can never rely on the continuing violation theory 
in challenging employment decisions made pursuant to a se-
niority system. 
3. Public policy underlying Lorance 
In the final analysis, the majority, while mindful of the 
tremendous liability facing companies and the interests of 
workers benefitted, even unjustly, by seniority systems, elected 
to leave some employees suffering discrimination without a 
remedy. There is no question that workers, relying on seniority 
systems for job security, have a valid interest. Likewise, there 
is no question that declaring a long-standing seniority system 
discriminatory would have a tremendous economic impact on 
companies and would require restructuring seniority systems 
mid-stream. But these concerns cannot justify the complete 
disregard of the interests of discriminated employees. A better 
balance must be struck. 
C. Universal Criticism of Lorance 
Writers and politicians have almost universally criticized 
the Lorance decision.23 The criticism has centered primarily 
on the difficult position in which Lorance places employees.24 
23. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 40(i)-(ii), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 136 CON<L 
REC. H8045 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990); Sondra Hemeryck et al., Reconstruction, 
Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1990); Jeffery M. Fisher, 
In the Wake of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.: Interpreting Title VII's Statute 
of Limitations {or Facially Neutral Seniority Systems, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 711 
(1990). 
24. Hemeryck expressed concerns with Lorance in this way: 
The Lorance decision alters the direction of Title VII law in 
two significant respects and could prove extremely damaging 
if not corrected by legislation. First, the decision adopts an 
extremely broad interpretation of section 703(h) of the [sic] 
Title VII, which provides special protections for seniority 
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1. Employees forced to jeopardize employment relations 
Lorance forces fully informed and legally adept employees 
to make a decision upon the adoption of a seniority system. The 
employee can either file a claim within 180 days of adoption 
and thereby jeopardize his relationship with his employer; or 
let the 180 days go by, hoping that the system will not ad-
versely affect him or her in the future. 
2. Speculative claims 
Criticism has also pointed out the speculative nature of a 
claim filed within 180 days of adoption.25 Because Lorance 
applies to facially neutral seniority systems, uncovering a dis-
criminatory intent within the first 180 days is nearly impossi-
ble. A complaint filed with the EEOC within the first 180 days 
would likely be incomplete and unpersuasive, but the specula-
tive nature of the claim becomes even more of a hindrance if it 
is filed in federal court, since it can be dismissed with preju-
dice. 
3. Ripeness and standing 
In order for a case to be heard by a federal court, the case 
must be ripe and the plaintiff must have standing.:w Ripeness 
far as the plan is facially neutral]. Second, the decision raises 
questions about the Court's acceptance of the continuing vio-
lations doctrine that has played an important role in Title 
VII litigation for almost two decades. While LorancP's rejec-
tion of this theory could be limited to cases involving seniori-
ty systems, the decision may have serious repercussions if its 
disapproval of the continuing violation theory is allowed to 
spread outside of this limited context. 
Hemeryck, supra note 24, at 557-58. The comment goes on to criticize Lorance 
from a public policy perspective "[since] Lorance will force employees to file pre-
mature and often unnecessary claims in order to preserve their rights," and sug-
gests that "the Lorance rule will waste valuable judicial resources and further 
strain an already overloaded administration system." !d. at 561-62. The comment 
ends by pointing out that "Lorance presents a trap for unknowledgeable employees, 
many of whom will be unaware that they must file a claim as soon as their em-
ployer adopts a new seniority system." !d. at 562-63. 
25. !d. 
26. Fisher points out the problem in this way: 
The claims of employees subject to a facially neutral seniority 
system involve future, speculative injuries which become dis-
tinct and palpable injuries when the seniority system con-
cretely affects them. Therein lies the inconsistency inherent 
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requires that there be a concrete issue of contention upon 
which the parties have a stake in the outcome. Standing re-
quires that the person bringing the lawsuit be a person suffi-
ciently and directly injured by the defendant. 
Lorance creates problems for a plaintiff since there may be 
little if any evidence of injury or discriminatory intent within 
the first 180 days of a facially neutral seniority system. A 
plaintiffs case, therefore, will inevitably be dismissed for lack 
of ripeness and/or standing if his claim is filed within the 180 
day period. 27 
Moreover, under Lorance, a plaintiff who eventually has a 
ripe claim and who has suffered a direct and palpable injury 
will be barred from bringing suit by the 180 day statute of 
limitations, since, in most instances, the discriminatory intent 
of the system is not discoverable within the 180 day period. 
The plaintiff would, for all intents and purposes, be without a 
remedy. 
4. Spreading of the Lorance rationale 
Critics feared that Lorance's rationale of starting the stat-
ute of limitations upon the adoption of a policy or employment 
practice would spread beyond seniority systems. These fears 
were confirmed in Davis v. Boeing Helicopter Co.28 and in 
EEOC v. City Colleges of Chicago. 29 
In Davis, the court held that a challenge of an allegedly 
in the Lorance framework; it requires that employees chal-
lenge a discriminatory system within 180 days of its adop-
tion, perhaps well before any individual suffers concrete harm 
[constituting injury in fact] .... 
Ripeness cases generally relate to speculative future harm 
that courts are reluctant to hear until the controversy has 
become concrete and focused .... 
Under a strict interpretation of Lorance, plaintiffs' claims 
will be time barred either because they have sued too early 
and are barred from a decision on the merits because of the 
jurisdictional requirements of standing and ripeness, or be-
cause they have sued to late and are barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Fisher, supra note 24, at 731, 733-34. 
27. The only possible way to avoid this result would be to allow a generic 
claim citing the possibility of future harm. This approach, however, would certainly 
not please most courts since allowing a generic claim to be filed would circumvent 
the entire purpose behind statutes of limitation. 
28. 1990 WL 131539 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 1990). 
29. 944 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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discriminatory promotional policy must be made at the time 
the policy was adopted rather than when the policy was applied 
to deny a promotion to a claimant. In City Colleges of Chicago, 
the same "adoption" rationale was used to bar an ADEA suit 
challenging application of an early retirement plan. Congress 
deliberately responded to this alarming trend by passing the 
1991 Act. 
D. How the Act Modifies Lorance 
Both the Republican Administration and the Democratic 
leadership of Congress were in agreement on the need to in-
validate Lorance, but they differed on how to replace it.30 In 
its final form, the Act most closely resembles the 
Administration's version. Specifically, the Act adds the follow-
ing paragraph to section 706(e) (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(e) (1988)): 
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice 
occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been 
adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in viola-
tion of this subchapter (whether or not that discriminatory 
purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision), 
when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual 
becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person ag-
grieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or 
provision of the system. 31 
The Act leaves no doubt concerning the continuing viability of 
Lorance. Lorance, insofar as seniority systems are concerned, is 
dead. 
1. Eliminating the distinction between facially neutral and 
facially discriminatory seniority systems 
Contrary to Lorance, the Act makes no distinction between 
facially neutral and facially discriminatory seniority systems. 
Eliminating the distinction makes sense. Employers, who are 
as legally sophisticated as any single group, constitute a cross 
section of society, and as such, include many who abhor dis-
30. See supra note 23. 
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992). The placement of this para-
graph is interesting. Rather than being added to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988), 
dealing with seniority systems, the paragraph was added to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-fi(e), 
dealing with the time period within which a claim must be filed with the EEOC. 
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crimination as well as some who are biased. For those who so 
desired, Lorance made discrimination easy. An employer only 
had to make the seniority system neutral on its face and then 
let the short statute of limitations run out. 32 
Lorance, however, failed to recognize the fact that the 
intent to discriminate was the same, whether the seniority 
system was facially neutral or facially discriminatory. Likewise, 
Lorance failed to recognize that, regardless of the language of 
the system, the overall effect of a discriminatory seniority sys-
tem on injured employees is essentially the same. The new Act 
corrects this senseless distinction and makes the intention to 
discriminate actionable, in spite of its window dressing.33 
2. Any provision of a seniority system 
The new Act also states that Title VII violations may arise 
from the discriminatory application of a seniority system or a 
provision of such a system. Thus, a plaintiff, rather than show-
ing that the whole seniority system violates Title VII, needs 
only show that some part of it does. 
The Act, however, fails to adequately clarify how this pro-
vision fits together with plaintiffs burden of showing that the 
seniority system was "adopted for an intentionally discrimina-
tory purpose."34 For example, must an employee only show 
that an intent to discriminate existed as to a single provision of 
the seniority system to successfully show the intent to discrimi-
nate, or must that employee show a predominant or underlying 
motive to discriminate as to the whole seniority system? 
32. It would, of course, be more challenging to draft a facially neutral, yet dis-
criminatory seniority policy, but such a task would not pose much of a problem for 
imaginative employers. 
33. One ironic aspect of Lorance is the fact that it permitted a facially discrim-
inatory system to be challenged at anytime. This is ironic because a facially dis-
criminatory system, since it is easier to recognize, is the only kind of seniority 
system that is likely be challenged within 180 days of adoption. Although facially 
neutral systems will now be subject to challenge after the 180 day period, facially 
neutral systems will enjoy more protection than facially discriminatory systems 
because a plaintiff will have the burden of showing that the seniority system or a 
provision of it was adopted with the intent to discriminate. Such a showing will be 
much more difficult when the intent to discriminate is not found on the face of the 
seniority system. Thus, by requiring the showing of intent, the new Act accommo-
dates some of the concerns implicitly expressed in Lorance. 
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992). 
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It seems overly burdensome and somewhat inconsistent to 
require a plaintiff to show a predominant motive of intentional 
discrimination as to the whole of the system, if the plaintiff is 
only injured by the application of a single provision for which 
she can prove the requisite intent. 
While the wording of the Act appears unclear, a careful 
reading suggests that an intent to discriminate can exist as to 
a single provision. This understanding is gleaned from the 
phrase "whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent 
on the face of the seniority provision."35 This phrase seems to 
indicate that a showing of a discriminatory purpose as to a 
single provision is sufficient. 36 
3. Three events constituting occurrences under§ 2000e-5(e) 
The Act significantly adds to the concept of "occurrence." 
The word "occurrence" is a term of art located in section 
2000e-5(e). Section 2000-5(e) requires that a charge of discrimi-
nation be filed with the EEOC "within 180 days after the al-
leged unlawful employment practice occurred." The word "oc-
cur," therefore, refers to the events which rise to the level of a 
Title VII violation, triggering the statute of limitations. 
According to the Act, "An unlawful employment practice 
occurs when ... the seniority system is adopted, when an indi-
vidual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a per-
son aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority 
system or a provision of the system."37 
a. Adoption of a seniority system. The first event 
constituting an "occurrence," triggering the statute of limita-
tions, is the adoption of the system. This meaning of "occur-
rence" was the only one recognized by the Court in Lorance. 
b. Becoming subject to a seniority system. The sec-
ond event constituting an "occurrence," triggering the statute of 
limitations, is when a person becomes subject to the seniority 
system. Congress demonstrated great insight when they incor-
35. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). 
36. Under the Democratic version of the Act, an employee would only have to 
show an intent to discriminate as to a single practice. That result is clearly ex-
pressed in the following language: "[ w )here . . . such system or practice was in-
cluded in such agreement with the intent to discriminate . . . the application of 
such system or practice . . . shall be an unlawful employment practice." 136 
CONG. REc. 81020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1980). 
37. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992). 
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porated this event. One of the greatest shortcomings of Lorance 
is the effect it had of barring all claims of workers hired 180 
days after the adoption of a seniority system. 38 
The new Act not only covers new emplnyees, but also cur-
rent employees who are transferred into or otherwise made 
subject to a different seniority system of the company. Protect-
ing current employees is wise because the interest of an em-
ployee in a particular seniority system should attach when they 
become subject to that system. 
The new Act also improves upon Lorance by ensuring that 
a constant stream of opportunities exist for challenging a dis-
criminatory seniority system. By giving workers the opportuni-
ty to challenge a seniority system each time a new person be-
comes subject to it, Congress has provided the means by which 
the kinks and shortcoming of a discriminatory seniority system 
can be phased out. This fine tuning is much more advanta-
geous than Lorance's position of preserving entrenched seniori-
ty systems and all their defects. 
c. Persons aggrieved by the application of a seniority 
system. The third event constituting an "occurrence," triggering 
the statute of limitations is "when a person aggrieved is injured 
by the application of the seniority system or a provision of the 
system."39 The key words upon which the meaning of this "oc-
currence" turn are "injured," "application," and "seniority sys-
tem." These terms are discussed at length in the next section. 
4. Core elements of a seniority system challenge 
under the Act 
This section explores the issue of when and under what 
circumstances a claim can be brought under the Act's provi-
sions. For the most part, this section outlines competing inter-
pretations. 
To begin with, it may help to characterize the provision in 
this way: the injury suffered must be the type which occurs as 
a result of a seniority system intentionally adopted for a dis-
criminatory purpose. Stated this way, we understand that (1) a 
seniority system must be in place; (2) the seniority system or a 
38. Arguably, an employee's only options would be to (1) not join the company 
if the discrimination was known, (2) stay on the job and endure the discrimination, 
or (3) quit. 
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-fi(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992). 
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provision of the system must have been intentionally adopted 
for a discriminatory purpose; (3) an injury of discrimination has 
occurred; and ( 4) the injury of discrimination was caused by the 
discriminatory seniority system or a discriminatory provision. 
a. Seniority system in place. Plaintiffs may find 
treatment under the seniority system theory more favorable 
than under the other theories of employment discrimination.40 
As a result, courts will have to develop rules describing what is 
and what is not a seniority system.41 
To begin with, we know that a collective bargaining agree-
ment is not a prerequisite for a seniority system, contrary to 
the Democratic version of the Act which specifically required 
that the seniority system be "part of a collective bargaining 
agreement."42 Beyond this, however, little else is clear, since 
"Title VII does not define the term 'seniority system,' and 
[since] no comprehensive definition of the phrase emerges from 
the legislative history."43 
The best guidance for defining a "seniority system" is found 
in California Brewers Association v. Bryant.44 In Bryant, the 
Court held that an employment practice giving greater benefits 
to permanent employees than temporary employees and requir-
ing a temporary employee to work at least 45 weeks in a single 
40. This is possible because § 112 of the new Act may make challenging a 
seniority system easier than challenging employment discrimination under some 
other theory. 
41. A broad definition of a seniority system could be any arrangement, no mat-
ter how informal, that takes into account the duration of employment in determin-
ing compensation and/or benefits. Examples of this could include an informal prac-
tice by a fast food restaurant of giving scheduling preferences to those workers 
employed the longest. 
42. 136 CoNe. REc. Sl020 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). By limiting the section to 
collective bargaining agreements, the Democrats were trying to strike a balance 
between employers and employees. The Democrats reasoned that: 
[m}ost employer practices, such as salary structures and work 
rules, remain in effect indefinitely once adopted. but [sic} 
when a seniority system is embodied in a collective bargain-
ing agreement that is . . . in force for only a limited peri-
od . . . the system must be reestablished . . . by each con-
tract that follows to continue in effect. 
H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, at 62 (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. fi49, 600. Thus stated, the Democratic version identified the need to 
protect the financial underpinnings of businesses by limiting the situations in 
which an entire employment system could be challenged. 
43. California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. fi98, 60fi (1980). 
44. 444 U.S. fi98 (1980). 
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calendar year before becoming a permanent employee was a 
seniority system for purposes of section 706(h). 
The Bryant Court defined a seniority system in this way: 
In the area of labor relations, "seniority" is a term that 
connotes length of employment. A "seniority system" is a 
scheme that, alone or in tandem with non-seniority criteria, 
allots to employees ever improving employment rights and 
benefits as their respective lengths of pertinent employment 
increase. Unlike other methods of allocating employment 
benefits and opportunities, such as subjective evaluations or 
educational requirements, the principal feature of any and 
every "seniority system" is that preferential treatment is 
dispensed on the basis of some measure of time served in 
employment. 45 
As with all other claims of discrimination, deciding what is 
or is not a seniority system will be a fact intensive inquiry. Be-
yond the definition given in Bryant, a court may also want to 
consider the following factors in determining what constitutes a 
seniority system: (1) the formality of the system,46 (2) the 
prevalence of the system,47 and (3) the expectations of the em-
ployees.48 
b. Intentionally discriminatory purpose. There are a 
couple of distinct issues that arise in connection with this ele-
ment. First, does the intent to discriminate have to exist when 
the seniority system was initially adopted, or is it sufficient if it 
exists when it is actually applied with the intent to discrimi-
nate? Second, must the discriminatory intent exist as to the 
whole of the system, or is it sufficient if it only exists as to a 
discriminatory provision?49 Third, how far will courts go in 
45. Id. at 605-06. 
46. Evaluating the formality of a seniority system is helpful because it allows 
an objective outsider to determine whether employees have a reasonable reliance 
expectation in the seniority system, Things to consider when making this determi-
nation are: (1) Is there a writing evincing a seniority system? (2) Is each worker 
made aware of an over-arching seniority plan? (;:1) are rules in place and are they 
followed? 
47. This goes to the issue of whether a system is selectively used to benefit or 
punish, or whether it is applied to all workers similarly situated. 
48. This is a subjective standard that evaluates the understanding of an indi-
vidual worker. It asks whether an employee has a bona fide right of expectation in 
a seniority system. Including this factor in the analysis is important because work-
ers often don't see the whole picture; instead they see a picture painted by their 
immediate supervisor. 
49. The Democratic version of the Act would have cleared up these ambiguities. 
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inferring a discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence? 
( 1) Adoption or use? The Act tells us that in or-
der for the section to apply we must have a "seniority system 
that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory pur-
pose."50 Clearly, the wording of the Act seems to cover the ini-
tial adoption of a seniority system. Thus read, the Act seems to 
imply that a seniority system must be somewhat formalistic 
and that a conscious decision to incorporate or follow a seniori-
ty plan must be made. The Act's wording, however, also leaves 
open the possibility of a second reading. 
That second reading focuses more on the words "adopted 
for an intentionally discriminatory purpose."51 By focusing on 
this language, one might argue that the section applies when-
ever a seniority system is used to intentionally discriminate, 
and not just when a seniority system is initially adopted to 
intentionally discriminate. 
The second reading allows an employee to challenge a 
seniority system that is intentionally construed or manipulated 
in such a way as to be discriminatory, regardless of whether 
the seniority system was initially adopted for an intentionally 
discriminatory purpose. This reading rightfully takes another 
step forward in addressing the rights of employees. Why should 
it matter whether the seniority system was initially adopted for 
a discriminatory purpose, if subsequently it is used for such a 
discriminatory purpose? The injury, after all, is exactly the 
same. 
My personal belief is that "when" the system is adopted is 
not as important as how it is used. I believe that when a 
company's top management, as opposed to middle management, 
decides to use a seniority system for a discriminatory purpose 
against certain employees, those employees should be able to 
challenge the discriminatory use of that system. I make a dis-
tinction between top management and middle management for 
the following reasons: (1) we are really interested in curing 
defects at the highest levels, since a decision to discriminate 
made at the highest levels will have the most far-reaching 
First, the intent to discriminate must exist at the time it was included in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, and second, the intent to discriminate can exist as to a 
single provision. 
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992). 
51. !d. 
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effect on workers; (2) a middle manager can manipulate a se-
niority system for an improper purpose, even though top man-
agement has exercised due care in avoiding discrimination; (3) 
the legal theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact 
exist to protect workers in situations where a middle manager 
intentionally discriminates against certain employees; and, (4) 
circumstantial evidence, which will have to be relied on when a 
challenge is made to a facially neutral seniority system, will 
indicate whether the discriminatory use of a seniority system 
has originated from top management or middle management, 
based on whether the discrimination is prevalent or isolated. 
(2) Whole system or any provision. This issue 
was discussed in an earlier section. That section concluded that 
a careful reading of the provision indicates that showing an in-
tent to discriminate as to a single provision is sufficient under 
the Act. 
(3) Degree of circumstantial evidence. If some-
thing is not discriminatory on its face, the only way to prove 
that it is discriminatory is through circumstantial evidence or 
testimony from someone in management. Since this kind of 
testimony is unlikely to surface, the degree to which courts will 
be willing to infer the requisite intent through circumstantial 
evidence will bear significantly on the vitality ofthis provision. 
As with other issues, this issue requires that a proper balance 
be struck between two extremes. 
On the one hand, if courts refuse to accept any circumstan-
tial evidence, then the Act will have done very little to improve 
upon the rigidity and unfairness of Lorance. On the other hand, 
if courts go too far in relying on inferences drawn from circum-
stantial evidence, then the focus of a court's inquiry will be 
shifted from discriminatory intent to discriminatory impact. 
The legal rules and evidentiary principles associated with a 
claim for disparate treatment might be a good place to look for 
answers regarding how these concerns might best be balanced. 
Generally speaking, the courts have used a burden-shifting 
approach in dealing with the issue of intent. A good example of 
this approach is Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust. 52 In 
52. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
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Watson, the burden-shifting approach was explained m this 
way: 
[T]he plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a 
discriminatory intent or motive. In order to facilitate the 
orderly consideration of relevant evidence, we have devised a 
series of shifting evidentiary burdens that are "intended pro-
gressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual 
question of intentional discrimination." Under that scheme, a 
prima facie case is ordinarily established by proof that the 
employer, after having rejected the plaintiff's application for a 
job of promotion, continued to seek applicants with qualifica-
tions similar to the plaintiff's. The burden of proving a prima 
facie case is "not onerous," and the employer in turn may 
rebut it simply by producing some evidence that it had legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the decision. If the defen-
dant carries this burden of production, the plaintiff must 
prove by a preponderance of all the evidence in the case that 
the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext 
for discrimination.53 
Watson's burden-shifting approach, although slightly modi-
fied by the Act, may be helpful here.54 
c. Injury. An injury must occur to the individual 
claimant. There are two aspects which a court may want to 
consider when determining whether an injury has occurred. 
The first aspect is the nature of the injury. The second aspect 
is the severity of the injury. 
As to the first, the injury claimed must be the type which 
occurs as a result of a discriminatory seniority system. The 
best way to determine whether an injury is the result of a 
discriminatory system is to look at the types of practices pro 
53. ld. at 986 (citations omitted). 
54. S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1991). 
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hibited by the Civil Rights Act55 and the closeness of the caus-
al connection between the seniority system and the injury. 
As to the second, any injury, if it is the type that occurs 
from a discriminatory seniority system, will normally be suffi-
cient to satisfy the element of injury. For example, under the 
Fair Housing Act cases, the injury element of a prima facie 
case is generally met if the plaintiff shows the injury required 
for standing. 56 Therefore, the severity of an injury will only be 
an issue of central importance when damages are considered. 
d. Causation: Linking together the injury, the seniori-
ty system and the 180 day limitations period. Causation can be 
thought of as the glue which joins all of the various elements 
together. For a claim to be actionable, there must be a link 
between the injury suffered and the seniority system that has 
been intentionally adopted for a discriminatory purpose. The 
seniority system, in other words, must cause the harm. In de-
fining the kind of connection required, the courts will look to 
the three triggering events. Of the three, the adoption of a 
seniority system and becoming subject to a seniority system are 
definite, one-time events that should be easy to apply here. 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) provides: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). 
56. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) 
(deprivation of social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society 
defined in terms of city blocks in suburban neighborhood rather than in apartment 
buildings was sufficient injury); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 
205 (1972) (tenants' claimed lost benefits of living in an integrated world and harm 
from being stigmatized as residents of a "white ghetto" came within the definition 
of persons aggrieved). Compare this level of injury with the injury required for a § 
1983 claim. See Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223 (fith Cir. 1988) (damages 
are only available for breaches of state torts arising from police conduct that cause 
meaningful injury, are grossly disproportionate to need presented, and are motivat-
ed by malice). 
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The application of a seniority provision is much less clear. 
Courts' interpretation of this "occurrence" will have a tremen-
dous impact on the usefulness of the Act to discriminated em-
ployees. Application just might mean use; for example, a se-
niority system might be "applied" every time it is used or taken 
into consideration when making paychecks or duty rosters. On 
the other hand, application might be read narrowly so that a 
seniority system could only be applied when a significant and 
distinct employment decision has been made, such as a promo-
tion, firing, or transfer. In light of the continuing violation 
theory, discussed at length in the next section, it might be 
advisable to embrace a more narrow reading. 
5. The continuing violation theory 
The continuing violation theory is a judicial response that 
counteracts the harsh results of the 180 day statute of limita-
tions applied to Title VII claims. It is a highly complex, fact 
specific inquiry. 
Under the theory, a plaintiff who files a claim within 180 
days of a Title VII violation can include related discriminatory 
acts that occurred outside of the 180 day period. Permitting a 
plaintiff to "relate back" enables him or her to recover damages 
for all related events. Courts have also used the theory to con-
nect violations occurring subsequent to the filing of a claim.57 
To come within the theory, a plaintiff must claim and prove 
either a continuing pattern of discrimination or a policy of 
discrimination. 
a. Pattern of discrimination or serial violation. To 
prove a continuing pattern of discrimination, or what some 
circuits call a serial violation,58 the plaintiff must show that 
57. See Anderson v. Block, 807 F.2d 145 (8th Cir. 1986). 
5R. In Mack v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1989), the 
court defined a serial violation in this way: 
What, then, is meant by the term "continuing violation?" 
In one incarnation, the theory recognizes that some acts are 
imbricated, i.e., they involve an interlinked succession of 
related events or a fully-integrated course of conduct. Al-
though the limitations clock generally starts with the commis-
sion of a discriminatory act, a true "continuing violation" 
rewinds the clock for each discriminatory episode along the 
way. Citations omitted. Thus, if the later violations in the 
series are within the prescriptive period, an employee may 
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the most recent act of a discriminatory pattern occurred within 
the last 180 days. That act must constitute a new violation and 
cannot simply be the effects59 of a discriminatory practice that 
occurred outside of the 180 day period.60 A plaintiff cannot 
use the continuing violation theory to resurrect claims conclud-
ed in the past, even though the violation's effects may persist. 
The plaintiff must next show that the act occurring within 
the 180 day period is the most recent act in a series of related 
acts. The recurring acts must be reasonably close in time and 
nature to constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination. The 
plaintiff must show by a preponderance of evidence more than 
the mere occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional 
discrimination.61 As a general rule, a claimant who has been 
pursue them despite the fact that earlier acts, forming part 
and parcel of the same pattern, have grown stale. Applying 
this reasoning, we held in Cajigas v. Banco de Ponce, 741 
F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1984), that although the primary discrimi-
natory act of which plaintiff complained (a gender-based pro-
motion) was time-barred, her action was nevertheless "timely 
with respect to at least the alleged discriminatory refusal 
[subsequently] to promote plaintiff to an available exeeutive 
position for which she was qualified" and as to which the 
limitations period remained open. 
Id. at l8a (citations omitted). 
59. See Douglas Laycock, Continuing Violations, Disparate Impact in Compensa-
tion and Other Title VII Issues, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. fi3 (1986). The author 
gives an insightful analogy to show the difference between a continuing effect and 
a continuing violation. He states it this way: 
Id. at fi7. 
If I run over a student with my car, the effects may last 
for the rest of his life. If he is paralyzed, he will probably be 
just as paralyzed ai age eighty as he was at age twenty. No 
jurisdiction has ever thought he could sue me at any time in 
that sixty-year period. My violation of the law would be over 
in an instant of negligence, and the statute of limitations 
would run from that instant. Whatever the moral force of the 
argument that Congress should have tried to undo the effects 
of past discrimination, that argument has no basis in continu-
ing violation theory. 
60. See, e.f?., Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); United 
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 5fi3 (1977). 
61. In Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 7lfi F.2d 
971 (fith Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986), the court discussed factors to be 
considered when determining a claim under the continuing violation theory. The 
court said: 
This inquiry, of necessity, turns on the facts and context of each particular 
case. Relevant to the determination are the following three factors, which we dis-
cuss but by no means consider to be exhaustive. The first is subject matter. Do 
the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them 
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denied hiring or has been terminated will find it difficult to 
prove a continuing violation.62 
b. Policy of discrimination or systemic viola-
tion.63 A policy of discrimination, or what some circuits call a 
systemic violation, may also constitute a continuing violation. 
[In] contrast lto] a serial violation, a systemic violation need 
not involve an identifiable, discrete act of discrimination tran-
spiring within the limitations period .... A systemic viola-
tion has its roots in a discriminatory policy or practice; so 
long as the policy or practice itself continues into the limita-
tion period, a challenger may be deemed to have filed a timely 
complaint.64 
in a continuing violation? The second is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring 
(e.g., biweekly paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated work assignment or 
employment decision? The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is the degree 
of permanence. Does the act have the degree of permanence which should trigger 
an employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights, or which should 
indicate to the employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences 
of the act is to be expected without being dependent on a continuing intent to 
discriminate. 
!d. at 9Hl. See also Waltman v. International Paper Co., H7fi F.2d 46H (5th Cir. 
l9H9) (applying the three prong Berry analysis). 
62. Ser>, P.g, CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL CoURTS, C-34 (1988). There are a 
few exceptions to this rule. Take, for example, Roberts v. North Am. Rockwell 
Corp., 6110 F.2d H2::l (6th Cir. 1981). In Roberts, the court recognized that a con-
tinuous refusal to hire can constitute a continuing and ongoing violation. This 
result should be compared to a termination which is usually viewed as a one-time 
event, incapable of being linked by a continuing violation theory. Allowing a person 
to apply for a job in order to create an event within the 180 day period and then 
use the that event to link back to past events, creates a significant opportunity for 
abuse. An example of a court finding a termination to be a continuing violation is 
Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610 (lOth Cir. 1988). 
63. See, e.!J., Thelma A. Crivens, The r:ontinuin!{ Violation Theory arui Systemic 
Discrimination: In Search o{ a Judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 VAND. L. 
REV. 1171 (198H) (suggests that there are three judicial standards of timeliness 
under Title VII, which are: (1) date-of-notification/injury standard, (2) manifesta-
tion/enforcement standard, (3) on going policy standard). 
64. Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 523 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). In 
Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 
1989), the court explained: "The continuing violation theory generally has been ap-
plied in the context of a continuing policy and practice of discrimination on a com-
pany wide basis; a plaintiff who shows that a policy and practice operated at least 
in part within the limitation period satisfies the filing requirements." ld. at 1480. 
[A) systematic policy of discrimination is actionable even if 
some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred 
prior to the limitations period. The reason is that the contin-
uing system of discrimination operates against the employee 
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The reasoning of this rule, at least in promotional set-
tings,65 has been explained in this way: "[A] challenge to sys-
tematic discrimination is always timely if brought by a present 
employee, for the existence of the system deters the employee 
from seeking his full employment rights or threatens to ad-
versely affect him in the future."66 
The court in Williams v. Owens-Illinois ,67 recognized that 
the systemic discrimination theory has limitations depending 
on the kind of practice involved. In Williams, the court ex-
plained: 
A refusal to hire or a decision to fire an employee may place 
the victim out of the reach of any further effect of company 
policy, so that such a complainant must file a charge within 
the requisite time period after their refusal to hire or termi-
nation, or be time-barred. If in those cases the victims can 
show no way in which the company policy had an impact on 
them within the limitations period, the continuing violation 
doctrine is of no assistance or applicability, because mere 
and violates his or her rights up to a point in time that falls 
within the applicable limitations period. Such continuing vio-
lations are most likely to occur in the matter of placements 
or promotions. 
Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
971 (1982) (citations omitted). 
65. In Higgins v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Sec. 
Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1199 (lOth Cir. 1981), the court found that an action alleging a 
discriminatory promotion practice was timely filed even though there were no 
available promotions for Higgins within the 180 days of filing his charge. The court 
relied on Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 833 (lOth Cir. 1975), in which 
the court held, "Discriminatory failure to promote [is] a continuing violation for 
purposes of Title VII filing requirements so long as the plaintiff is alleging such 
nonpromotion over a period of time." ld. at 1200. 
66. Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 7.57, 761 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing 
Elliot v. Sperry Rand Corp, F.R.D. 580, 586 (D. Minn. 1978)). A variation of this 
argument was also expressed in Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610 
(lOth Cir. 1988). In Gray, the court rejected a continuing violation theory of ter-
minated employees. The court rejected the claim because: 
ld. at 614. 
When an employee is terminated, the employment relation-
ship ends; and the fear of reprisal and the reasons for allow-
ing employees to claim a continuing discriminatory policy are 
removed. Moreover, if former employees were allowed to as-
sert charges after 180 days had passed from the date of 
termination, the purpose of the statute of limitations would 
be undermined and employers could be exposed to unlimited 
suits. 
67. 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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'continuing impact from past violations is not actionable. Con-
tinuing violations are.'68 
207 
Some of the circuits, in contrast to those circuits that only 
require current employment and current application of the 
policy, require the plaintiff to show that the discriminatory 
policy in question was actually applied to that plaintiff during 
the 180 day period. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held 
that 
to establish a continuing violation, a plaintiff must show some 
application of the illegal policy to him (or to his class) within 
the 180 days preceding the filing of his complaint. (Citations 
omitted). Just as there can be no negligence in the air, so the 
existence of a quiescent discriminatory policy is simply insuf-
ficient to toll the statute of limitations. To hold to the con-
trary would expose employers to a virtually open-ended period 
of liability and would, as we said, read the statute of limita-
tions right out of existence.69 
c. Which doctrine applies? The threshold question 
that must be asked here is which doctrine of the continuing 
violation theory should apply to seniority systems. Adopting the 
systemic, policy discrimination doctrine for seniority systems is 
the common sense answer to this question because a seniority 
system is probably the first thing a person thinks of when 
asked to name an employment policy. 
On the other hand, an argument can be made that a se-
niority system should fall under the pattern of discrimination 
doctrine since discriminatory practices under a seniority system 
could easily be considered a pattern or series of related events, 
and there is no bright line test distinguishing patterns from 
policies. 
Because courts may apply either continuing violation doc-
trine, it is necessary to examine what an employee would have 
to prove under each doctrine. 
( 1) Systemic, policy discrimination. Under the 
discriminatory policy doctrine, a claimant can attack and col-
lect damages that have arisen since the inception of a seniority 
6R. !d. at 924 (citations omitted). 
69. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 5::1::1-34 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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system if the following conditions are met: the claimant is a 
current employee; the discriminatory policy adversely affected 
the claimant at some time; and the discriminatory policy is still 
in effect. In those circuits requiring it, a claimant will also need 
to show that the discriminatory event occurred within the 180 
day period. 
(2) Discriminatory pattern. Under the discrim-
inatory pattern doctrine, a claimant will have to prove that an 
incident of discrimination has occurred within the 180 day 
period and that the incident is part of a pattern of discrimina-
tion. The relative ease or difficulty of making this showing will 
depend on how the concepts of "incident or injury" and "pattern 
of discrimination" are interpreted by the courts. 
(a) "Incident or injury." Under a broad read-
ing, "incident or injury" could mean any recurring effect of a 
discriminatory seniority system. For example, if a seniority 
system affected a person's pay, then each paycheck received 
could be considered an incident or injury. This would be con-
sistent with equal pay cases that consider each paycheck to be 
a new violation. Likewise, if a seniority system affected a 
worker's schedule, then every day worked pursuant to such 
system would constitute a new injury. 
On the other hand, a court may give the provision a more 
narrow reading. Under a narrow reading, only decisions im-
pacting an employee's status would be considered an incident 
or injury. Thus, an injury or incident would only occur at the 
time a decision was made as to an employee's compensation, 
work schedule, demotion, transfer or termination. 
In short, a broad reading of injury or incident would focus 
on recurring affects of a status-changing decision, while a nar-
row reading of it would focus on the status-changing decision 
itself. 
(b) Pattern of discrimination. The concept of 
"pattern of discrimination" can also be read broadly or narrow-
ly. A broad reading would lump all decisions and effects of a 
seniority system into one category. Thus, any employment re-
lated decision made pursuant to a seniority system would be a 
part of the discriminatory pattern, no matter how different the 
employment actions might be. 
A narrow reading would compartmentalize employment 
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injuries into different groups of employment decisions. Accord-
ingly, an employee seeking to establish a pattern of discrim-
ination as to transfers could not rely on evidence of other kinds 
of employment discrimination. 
d. Likely impact of the continuing violation theo-
ry. As mentioned above, the continuing violation theory is a 
judicial response to the harsh results of the 180 day statute of 
limitations. Arguably, the continuing violation theory as ap-
plied to seniority systems should be scaled back since Congress 
has significantly reduced the harshness of the short limitation 
period. If either the discriminatory pattern doctrine or the dis-
criminatory policy doctrine is applied, seniority systems will be 
under all out attack since a claimant will find it relatively easy 
to relate back and link up all of his or her claims of discrimina-
tion. 70 If this happens, the statute of limitations and the ob-
jectives that underlie it might become meaningless. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has introduced and discussed some of the issues 
the judiciary will face in applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
to seniority systems. In contrast to Lorance's one-sided weigh-
ing of interests, it is my hope that the judiciary will adequately 
take into account the interests of all relevant parties in decid-
ing these critical employment issues. 
R. Chet Loftis 
70. The potential effect becomes even greater when this doctrine is coupled 
with the discovery strand of equitable tolling, allowing for the tolling of the statute 
of limitations until the discriminatory purpose is discoverable. It should also be 
noted that the legislative history suggests that: 
What [the seniority system amendment] does not do is affect 
existing law with respect to the "continuing violation" theory. 
Instead, this subsection of the legislation addresses discrimi-
natory employment rules and decisions in their first appli-
cation after adoption by the employer. 
The "continuing violation" theory generally arises 
where the employer's continuing conduct or pattern of ongoing 
discrimination causes multiple or repeated injuries to mem-
bers of groups protected under the statute. 
H.R. REI'. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 at 2;:l (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 716-17. 
